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December 6, 1974


FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 26: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw Pact forces for theatre war?

I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

A. The effort with regard to this KIQ will be concentrated on providing a good estimate of the combat effective-ness of Warsaw Pact ground forces and tactical aviation in Eastern Europe, and also on non-Soviet national air defense forces there -- and on Pact perceptions of NATO strengths and weaknesses.

II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ



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B. Production. The primary community output will be in the
US MC-161 position paper/NIE 11-14 effort. DIA, CIA and
25X1X1 will be the principal participants under the aegis
& NSA 25X3 of the NIO. NOTE: Readiness, mobilization and reinforcement are considered in KIQ 27; logistics in KIQ 28.

III. COMMENTS OF THE NIO/CF

A. The greatest evident deficiency at the outset of work on this KIQ is the insufficient number of analysts assigned at CIA and DIA to work in this area in the short term because of the demands for MBFR support. Although generally speaking adequate amounts of information are collected there are some areas where additional effort is needed.

More useful data can probably be provided by:

25X1X4

25X1X4

-- improved dissemination

25X1X1

reporting throughout DIA and CIA.

25X1X1

- -- greater effort toward the exploitation of emigre, refugee and defector sources especially on the subjects of Soviet mobilization and reserve training.
- B. It does not seem profitable to reduce the present level of analytic effort devoted to MBFR, but if the Intelligence Community is to provide the support required by Secretary Schlesinger in his attempts to optimize NATO conventional

KIO 26 - 2

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- force structure, more analytic effort will be required for this and KIQs 27 and 28.
- C. In addition to more analysts, there is a need for improved analytic methodologies to support assessments of Warsaw Pact strengths and weaknesses increlation to current and future NATO posture.

KIQ 26 - 3

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